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In this paper we deal with the design of three social insurance schemes (old age social security, health insurance an child 
benefits) in a federal setting such as the Belgian one. We argue that  these three programs need to be reformed to be more 
efficient and more equitable. In none of these cases regional decentralization would be the most important  element of the 
reform. Yet, in all three cases, some inefficiencies can be removed by a careful design of the relative competencies of the 
regions and the federal state. An open discussion over these issues is urgently needed to avoid a stalemate in which the 
necessary reforms are blocked. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Suppose for the sake of the argument that we have a federal state with two regional governments. The two 
regions are different and heterogeneous. Heterogeneity is in productivity, health and tastes. The federal 
government has full information on these characteristics and is not restricted in its policy tools. It pursues an 
objective of social welfare that is supported by the two regions. Under these conditions there is no need of 
decentralization. Any policy that can be conducted by the regional governments can be conducted as well by the 
federal government. As soon as we depart from these assumptions, e.g. when the regional governments have 
better information than the federal one on some of their population’s characteristics, some decentralization can 
be advocated. However, we should keep in mind that the central government has two comparative advantages 
even when information is asymmetric. It is the only one that can cope with both-interregional redistribution and 
interregional externalities.
 4  
 
In the next section, we will briefly summarize the general arguments against or for decentralization of social 
protection schemes. We will then look in more detail at three specific cases: retirement pensions; health care and 
health insurance; and child benefits.
5 One should keep in mind that in the discussion of decentralization the 
starting conditions are crucial. Moving from independent states towards some form of federalism as the EU 
members did is different from moving from a central state to a federal one as Belgium has been doing over the 
last decades. This is the so-called premium to status quo.We will consider the specific Belgian situation. In the 
case of Belgium interregional redistribution is an issue as the two regions have different average incomes. 
Interregional (or horizontal) externalities are less important than vertical externalities. 
 
In the present Belgian political system, a distinction is made between the “regions” and the “communities”. The 
distinction is especially relevant with respect to the position of Brussels. In this paper we focus on matters of 
principle and we will largely neglect the distinction between regions and communities. We use the term 







We first remind briefly the general arguments in favour of decentralization of government expenditures. In the 
second subsection, we apply these general principles to social security.  
 
 
2.1. Arguments in favour of decentralization 
 
Let us first sketch the standard arguments in favour of decentralization: 
 
•  Catering to regional preferences and needs 
 
Different regions may have different demands for types and levels of public goods and services.  These demand 
differences may simply reflect differences in the subjective personal preferences of the residents themselves, or 
they may come from more objective factors such as geographical differences, demographic differences, or 
relative price/cost differences.  The presumption is that central provision will tend to be uniform, so that 
efficiency could be improved if regional communities were allowed to provide their own policy to cater to local 
preferences and needs. 
 
•  Information asymmetries 
 
There are some spheres of policy making in which regional governments (and/or their municipalities) may be 
better informed and therefore better able to provide public services effectively than the federal government.  This 
information advantage can be with respect to the differences in preferences mentioned before. Yet, equally 
                                                        
4 In principle social insurance policies can be decentralized if the decentralized systems are complemented by a long run-
insurance system at the level of the regions – see Drèze (2000) and the discussion about Drèze’s proposal in Decoster (2009). 
5 We do not discuss unemployment benefits. This issue is closely linked to the one of labour market policies and its full 
treatment was beyond the topic of this paper – see Cockx and Van der Linden (2009).  
6 This section is heavily based on chapter 3 of Boadway and Shah (2009). 
   3 
important are the information issues associated with administering public programs and delivering both public 
services and targeted transfers.  
 
•  Innovation and cost-effectiveness in public programs 
 
Decentralization may lead to improvements and innovations in program design and program delivery because of 
the opportunities and constraints faced by regional decision-makers.  When there are many regions, perhaps in 
competition with one another, there are more opportunities for innovations. Good innovations can then be 
imitated by the other regions. 
 
•  Political economy arguments 
 
First, it is sometimes claimed that regional governments are “closer to the electorate” and should therefore 
behave in a more accountable way. There is not much empirical evidence to support this view, however 
(Boadway and Shah, 2009). Second, in some extreme public choice views, political competition between regions 
may help to tame the governments acting as self-serving Leviathans, always attempting to become bigger by 
extracting resources from an unwitting electorate. Third, in the Belgian context one sometimes hears the 
argument that the federal political system is unable to introduce necessary reforms, because the decision-making 
process is blocked by the tensions between the different regions. This stalemate would lead to a dangerous 
conservatism, making it impossible to change the status quo. 
  
 
2.2. Application to social insurance and redistribution 
 
With these general principles as a background, we can look now at the specific categories of public expenditures 
we are interested in: social insurance and redistributive transfers. A comparative assignment of responsibilities in 
12 federal countries is summarized in Table 1 (taken from Boadway and Shah, 2009). 
 
 
2.2.1. Social insurance 
 
Two alternative types of social insurance can be distinguished.  The first involves insurance against unexpected 
adversities that are not insured by the private sector.  Market failures may be due to factors such as moral hazard, 
adverse selection or administrative costs. In almost all industrialized countries government has become involved 
in the provision of this form of social insurance. Examples include unemployment insurance, workers 
compensation covering injury on the job, and that part of health insurance that deals with sickness as a 
consequence of unexpected health shocks. The second form of social insurance relates to adverse outcomes that 
are uninsurable, especially those that are revealed at birth.  Specifically, persons may be born with different 
abilities, skills and productivities. In the extreme, they may be disabled or they may be genetically prone to 
serious chronic illness. These risks are obviously uninsurable by the private sector. Again, governments are 
heavily involved in all industrialized countries, e.g. by guaranteeing universal health insurance at regulated 
premiums, or by setting up a system of public pensions.
7   
 
The balance of advantages to disadvantages of decentralization may differ from one form of program to another.    
The main arguments for decentralization from the previous subsection apply directly here. Regional 
governments should have an advantage at tailoring social insurance programs to suit the needs of their residents. 
They should be better at targeting the programs to those for whom the programs are intended.  They should be 
better at overcoming agency problems. They could be more innovative in elaborating new solutions in a rapidly 
changing economic and social environment. Thus, it is not surprising that many of these social programs are 
assigned to regional governments in federations. 
 
However, there are also disadvantages of decentralizing the provision of social insurance to the regions.  
Different regions may face very different needs for social insurance because of the demographic composition of 
their populations or because of adverse events in the past that were beyond their responsibility. In the case of the 
first form of social insurance, regions may face idiosyncratic risks that could be partially pooled across regions 
by central provision. Interregional competition may induce individual regions to reduce the level of protection 
                                                        
7 A progressive income tax scheme can also be seen as a form of this kind of social insurance.   4 




2.2.2. Transfers to individuals 
 
Transfers to individuals are components of the overall redistributive policy of governments.  Here again we can 
distinguish two broad categories. The first are demogrants, i.e. lump-sum transfers of a given amount to all 
persons of a given demographic category: universal transfers to the elderly or universal transfers to families 
according to the number of children. For these demogrants, there are in principle no particular advantages to 
decentralization.  
 
The second category consists of transfers that are targeted to individuals according to their particular 
circumstances, the typical example being welfare or social assistance transfers made to the needy. These targeted 
transfers rely for their delivery on local agencies whose role is to identify the needy and monitor them for 
continued eligibility.  Therefore, information asymmetries offer strong arguments in favour of decentralization, 
mainly of the control of the agencies and the programs they administer. 
 
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics on division of powers in 12 federalism countries (Source: Boadway and Shah, 
2009) 
 
Number of countries with shared and/or subnational assignment 
Expenditure category  Responsibility  Provision 
 
Unemployment insurance  1  2 
Education  11  11 
Social welfare  9  10 
Health  9  11 
 





3. Old age social security 
 
Retirement pensions largely fall in the category of “demogrants”. As we have seen, there are for that category no 
strong theoretical arguments in favour of decentralization. This does not mean that the current Belgian situation 
does not raise some difficult challenges. Moreover, in some specific cases there is need for coordination of 
policies between the federal and the regional level. 
 
 
3.1. Current situation and challenges 
 
There are two ways of dealing with retirement and pensions. The narrow way consists in focusing on people 
aged 65+; the broad way deals with the elderly population that is not anymore active whatever the reason 
(disability, unemployment, early or regular retirement). In that respect the average age at which Belgian workers 
cease working is around 59 (it was 57 a few years ago). Both Flemish and Walloon workers behave in the same 
way towards retirement. They also get about the same public pensions benefits. The big differences between the 
two regions are with respect to life duration and relative contributions. Life expectancy is higher in Flanders. In 
2006, longevity of women (men) was 81.64 (75.09) in Wallonia and  83.32 (78.08) in Flanders
8. On the other 
hand, because of its larger per capita tax base, Flanders contributes relatively more to the pension system. The 
before tax average income was 12807€ in Wallonia and 14483€ in Flanders
9. According to a back of the 
envelope calculation, pension spending is 15% lower in Wallonia and the tax base is 10% higher in Flanders. In 
other words to a large extent the two phenomena offset each other. 
                                                        
8 See on this http://www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d23_fr.asp#Esperance 
9 For data on incomes, see http://www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d321_fr.asp   5 
 
There is a growing second pillar in Belgium; it benefits from federal tax breaks. Overall its prevalence is higher 
in Brussels (42) than in the Flemish (31) and in the Walloon region (36)
10. Its relative importance as well as that 
of the third pillar is still negligible relative to the first pillar. Concerning the issue of long-term care, it is clear 
that this will concern Flanders more than Wallonia given their age structure. For example, one knows that the 
dependency rate (based on SHARE data) in the age bracket 70-74 is 7 and 14% for men and women respectively 
whereas it rises to 37 and 52% for the age bracket 85-89.
11 
 
The Belgian pension system faces difficult challenges. First, an average age of 59 for exiting the labour market is 
unacceptably low. The rate of activity among elderly workers should be increased. This would not only narrow 
the gap with the Lisbon targets, but more importantly it would alleviate the financial pressure on the pension 
system and prepare the country, and particularly Flanders, to a labor force shortage.  Increasing the rate of 
activity among elderly workers requires a change in the incentives at both sides of the market (labour supply and 
labour demand). Second, by European standards pension benefits in Belgium are low; this explains the relatively 
high rate of poverty among the Belgian elderly population
12. Third, despite this rather low pension level, one 
may doubt that the present Belgian system of retirement pensions is sustainable in the long run. While increasing 
the activity rate of the elderly would help a lot (and is most probably the most effective measure), other policy 
interventions may be necessary. 
 
 
3.2. What about decentralization? 
 
The problems relating to the pension system are common to the two regions. There is a relatively large degree of 
consensus among decision-makers about how to tackle these problems. Even in the Walloon region, where the 
“lump of labor fallacy” is today well understood, rising the age of retirement is now deemed desirable. By the 
way, the opposition among the population against such an increase in the retirement age also seems quite 
uniformly spread over the whole Belgian territory. Yet, despite this opposition, the first thing to do is to increase 
the rate of activity of elderly workers, while protecting workers who truly need the support of either disability or 
unemployment insurance that are often used to exit elderly workers from the labor market. It is important to 
strengthen testing and monitoring in those two schemes. Second, regarding low benefits, one should link the 
basic minimal benefits (retirees with or without entitlements, surviving spouses) to the poverty threshold. Third, 
as for sustainability, it demands raising the effective age of retirement, raising the level of contributions and 
widening the accessibility to the second pillar. Incidentally, this widening does not necessarily call for additional 
tax breaks. None of these measures requires a decentralization of the system of retirement pensions. It would 
thus seem that there are no equity nor efficiency gains to be expected from decentralizing old age pensions. This 
is perfectly in line with the general ideas presented in the previous section.  
 
There is, however, one important caveat. Raising the age of retirement (the most essential policy measure) 
requires some active labour market policies. Many of the instruments of such active labour market policies are in 
the hands of the regional governments. However, unemployment compensations, early retirement benefits and 
pensions are paid at the federal level. This may lower the incentives for the regional governments to introduce 
costly measures to stimulate the employment of the elderly. Moreover, some of the arguments in favour of 
decentralization seem to be relevant for the case of active labour market policies: regional governments may be 
better informed, decentralization may stimulate innovation, there might even be some interregional differences 
in needs, e.g. because of the demographic differences. The pros and cons of decentralizing active labour market 
policies should therefore be high on the political agenda (see the discussion in Cockx and Van der Linden, 
2009).  
 
There is a specific point here. In the present system, it is tempting for regions to free ride on the federal 
government by early retiring some of their workers. In the regional civil service, there are a number of instances 
where regions push their employees into early retirement (they either replace them by younger and cheaper 
employees or they do not replace them) at the expenses of the federal government. To overcome this difficulty 
one would need an incentive scheme that would penalize regional or community governments that early retire 
                                                        
10 These figures give the % of retirees receiving those pensions (Berghman et al., 2007). As to the amount of average 
monthly benefits they are 517€, 513€ and 773€ in the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels regions respectively.  
11 We will not discuss in this paper this issue of long term care (insurance). 
12 According to Eurostat sources, in 2006, the poverty rate among those aged 65+ was 23% in Belgium as opposed to 16% in 
France, 13% in Germany and 6% in the Netherlands (for a threshold equal to 60% of the median income). See: 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/living_conditions_and_social_protection/data/main_tables>   6 
their employees. This scheme could be inspired by the experience rating approach to unemployment 
compensation, in which firms using the unemployment insurance system more often have to pay higher 




4. Health care and health insurance 
 
Health insurance and the provision of health care are closely linked. International comparisons show a lot of 
institutional variation, even more than in other sectors of social security. For our purposes, the most important 
distinction is between systems with mainly government regulation and systems where insurers play a more 
active role. We will argue that this is the main issue in the Belgian setting. Decentralization is desirable and does 
not necessarily threaten interpersonal solidarity, if it is designed carefully. However, the real question is whether 
we should give more power to the sickness funds or to the regional governments.  
 
 
4.1. Current situation and challenges 
 
Belgium has a hybrid system of health insurance. On the one hand, there is compulsory health insurance with a 
very broad coverage. On the other hand, both providers and patients have a large freedom of choice. Provider 
payments are still largely fee-for-service, although there is a move towards prospective (DRG-) financing, 
mainly for hospitals. Patients can freely choose their sickness fund. These sickness funds play an important role 
in the system, but they act as a cartel in the negotiations with the providers.  
 
There is outspoken interregional variation in medical practices. Part of this variation can be explained by 
differences in morbidity, but even after correcting for morbidity significant differences remain (Jacques et al., 
2006). These differences suggest that there are clear inefficiencies in the system. However, the same 
phenomenon occurs in all countries in the world and as such it is not a good argument for regional 
decentralization.  
 
The Belgian health insurance system is in need of reform. In the present situation, most of the attention goes to 
the rapid (and according to some unsustainable) growth in expenditures. It can be expected, however, that this 
growth will continue and, moreover, it may be desirable from a welfare point of view (Hall and Jones, 2007; 
Dormont, 2009). If this increase in medical expenditures will not be financed through collective social insurance, 
there is a severe danger of growing social inequalities in the access to the system. At this moment, and compared 
to other countries, own payments of the patients are already relatively large in Belgium. Moreover, the socio-
economic inequalities in health remain huge, and are most probably linked to factors outside the health care 
system (housing, inequalities in education, etc.) What is perhaps more surprising is the fact that the health results 
of the Belgian system are far from excellent. Although there is little structured supervision of quality (which as 
such is already a bad signal), the available indicators suggest that the quality of care is mediocre. How to 
improve efficiency, quality and equity in a situation of growing expenditures? 
 
It seems that quality can only increase and expenditures can only be kept under control, if the freedom of choice 
of patients and (even more importantly) providers is to some extent curtailed. This means that we have to move 
in the direction of “managed care”, probably involving also some pay-for-performance and other financial 
incentives. During the last decades, cautious steps in that direction have already been taken, mainly by the 
government (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde, 2005). However, the structure of negotiations between various 
partners (government, providers, sickness funds, social partners, pharmaceutical firms) is cumbersome. Things 
are complicated because of the linguistic divide and the tensions in this regard. The power position of the various 
partners in the negotiations is not the same in all parts of the country, e.g. the position of general practitioners is 
stronger in Flanders. Moreover, the present allocation of tasks to the federal and the regional levels is not fully 
transparent nor coherent. There are obvious problems of coordination between welfare and health care, e.g. with 
respect to mental care or long term care for the elderly. While prevention in principle is the responsibility of the 
regions, the federal level also takes initiatives in this domain (e.g. smoking ban). There are now plans to 
introduce a system of supplemental hospital insurance at the Flemish level. 
 
What seems missing is a long run-view on on the future development of the system. This lack is partly explained 
by the misplaced complacency of the sector and by the permanent relative popularity of health insurance among 
the population. At the same time, however, the issue of decentralization is looming over the whole debate, more 
than in other sectors. In a situation in which some players consider regional decentralization as a corner stone of   7 
every good reform, while other players vehemently reject each step in that direction as a breach of solidarity, 
discussions get very difficult indeed. 
 
 
4.2. What about decentralization? 
 
The theoretical structure in section 2 draws attention to the importance of information asymmetries and of the 
opportunities to innovate as an argument for decentralization on the one hand, and on redistribution as an 
argument in favour of centralization on the other hand. Both arguments are especially relevant in the context of 
health insurance. Indeed, more than any other sector, the health care system is characterized by asymmetric 
information (Arrow, 1963). At the same time, there seems to be near-consensus in European societies that health 
care should be financed in an equitable, “redistributive” way. Let us focus on the two arguments in turn. How to 
think about a long run-project for the Belgian health insurance system? 
 
4.2.1. Asymmetric information and decentralization 
 
There can be no doubt that decentralization is an essential element in any good health care system. This fits very 
well into the objective of having more (and better) managed care. The real question is whether we should 
decentralize power towards the regions or towards the sickness funds. The first direction (decentralization 
towards the regions) fits into a National Health Service-type model, in which the government remains the 
principal actor. In such a model (as suggested in Table 1),  regions mostly play an essential role.
13 At the same 
time there is in many of these countries, with England being the most evident example, a move towards the 
introduction of what is called “internal market”- mechanisms.The second direction has been taken in countries 
with insurers or sickness funds. In the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, individual insurers have received 
more instruments to effectively control expenditures.
14 In this model of “regulated competition”, the government 
remains an essential player. It introduces a compensation scheme between the insurers, so that the insurers with 
better risks (the young and healthy) get relatively less financial means, while the insurers with the worse risks 
(the sick and elderly) get more. This should remove the incentives for risk selection (see below). The regional 
dimension can then still be introduced in the system in many different ways
15, but the main challenge consists in 
creating a workable degree of (regulated) competition between insurers.  
 
The choice between the two models is not an easy one. Because of the hybrid nature of its health care system 
(with free choice of sickness funds, but sickness funds acting as a cartel), Belgium can go either way. In the 
health care system, the asymmetric information issue is closely linked to the issue of innovation in program 
design and program delivery. Who is better placed for this, the regional governments or the sickness funds? We 
believe that there is a good case to be made for a greater role of the sickness funds.
16 Regional decentralization is 
then still possible, but it may be counterproductive, since it might create strong power positions of some sickness 
funds in some regions. Indeed, the Belgian compulsory health insurance system can be characterized as an 
oligopoly with some really big players that are moreover unevenly distributed over the whole territory. Of 
course, the degree of competitiveness will also depend on the decision whether or not to allow the entry of 
private insurers in the compulsory health insurance market. In any case, in this approach decentralization 
becomes a minor issue. 
 
All this does not imply that the division of competencies should not be defined in a more coherent way. In fact, it 
should be made clear that prevention is part of health policy and is within the realm of the regions. It is 
sometimes claimed that the regions do not have the right incentives to do prevention, as long as health care 
expenditures are borne at the national level. This argument is not very convincing, however. First, it requires an 
extremely cynical view on policy makers, in which they would be more concerned with the financial than with 
the health consequences of prevention. There is not much evidence to confirm this cynical view. Moreover, 
while prevention is good for health, it very often leads to an increase rather than a decrease in health care 
expenditures. Non-smokers live longer and are, over the whole of their life, more expensive than smokers. From 
a broader perspective, it is well known that a coherent health policy should not in the first place concentrate on 
medical care. Improving the health of the population and decreasing socio-economic inequalities in health have 
                                                        
13 The precise allocation is not completely evident, however. In many countries there seems to be an almost permanent 
reshuffling from competences from the local to the regional to the national level and back.  
14 A description of these systems can be found in Van de Ven et al. (2003, 2007). 
15 In Switzerland insurers can differentiate the premiums in the different regions. 
16 See Bevan and van de Ven (2009) for a critical comparison of both approaches, focused on the UK and the Netherlands 
(the two standard reference cases).   8 
more to do with social housing, integration of minorities, poverty and education. The regions already control the 
most important instruments in all these domains. However, the most difficult coordination problems arise with 
respect to the coordination of welfare (including long term-care) and health care policies. An open debate about 
these issues is urgently needed. 
 
4.2.2. Solidarity, redistribution and decentralization 
 
The need for solidarity and equitable redistribution is often used as a decisive argument against all regional 
decentralization. It is not a convincing argument, however, although it does require some careful thinking about 
the best financing scheme. More specifically, there is no problem at all to decentralize some policy instruments 
while at the same time keeping the financing at the national level. The basic idea here is similar to the financing 
scheme that is now already used for the sickness funds. Let us therefore first explain how this system works. 
 
All citizens pay health care contributions that are collected in a “central fund”.
17 At the same time they have a 
free choice of sickness fund. The means collected by the central fund are divided over these sickness funds, 
taking into account not only the number but also the characteristics of their members. Risk adjusted subsidies are 
calculated with a regression-based formula, including among other variables age, gender, indicators of chronic 
illness and socio-economic vulnerability. More specifically, sickness funds with more elderly, chronically ill, 
etc. get more. The advantages of this scheme are clear. Given that financing remains centralized, it is possible to 
implement any desired vertical redistribution scheme. It is even possible to finance the central fund with taxes. 
Given the system of risk adjustment, incentives for risk selection are minimized. Given that risk adjustment is 
based on ex ante-characteristics and not on ex post-expenditures, the sickness funds keep all the necessary 
incentives to keep expenditures under control. Solidarity and incentives for efficiency therefore remain intact. 
 
Similar financing schemes are applied in many NHS-systems (such as England or Italy). Here also one has a 
central collection of financial means, which are then divided over the regions on the basis of a “risk-adjusted” 
allocation formula. The regions remain responsible for their own expenditures, but given the risk adjustment in 
the correction formula, they are treated in an equitable way.
18 Note, however, the difference between regional 
decentralization and decentralization towards the insurers. The latter option creates a danger of risk selection, 
which is not present in the former case. On the other hand, competing insurers will have stronger incentives to 
offer good quality and to introduce innovations, since this will make them more attractive for citizens/patients.  
 
The basic choice about how to decentralize therefore remains open. While we agree that interpersonal solidarity 
is essential in a civilized society, it can be reconciled with any of the two systems.  
 
We can summarize. Decentralization is desirable in health care and health insurance. This does not necessarily 
imply regional devolution, however. The crucial debate should be about the future role of the Belgian sickness 
funds. This choice has to be made on the basis of the arguments of asymmetric information and innovation. 
There are strong equity arguments to keep financing at the central level. It is possible, however, to go in the 




5. Child benefits 
 
Child benefits are another example of “demogrants” and therefore there is no prima facie case for 
decentralization. However, as for pensions, there is need for coordination of policies between the federal state 
and the regions and in some specific cases decentralization may help to get at a more efficient system.  
 
 
5.1. Current situation and challenges 
  
The introduction in 1930 of statutory child benefit was characterised by strongly diverging views, including 
between Flanders and Wallonia, on what was the most appropriate design: in view of the lower and sharply 
declining birth rate in Wallonia, the Walloon industrialists – supported by the socialist party – were in favour of 
                                                        
17 The “central fund” in Belgium is RIZIV/INAMI. 
18 In some Scandinavian countries, where local financing is more important, there are compensation schemes which basically 
aim at the same end result. A fairly general (but already somewhat obsolete) comparison of the systems in different countries 
can be found in Rice and Smith (2001).    9 
higher child benefit amounts for the first and second children; in child-rich Flanders, on the other hand, much 
emphasis was put on the need for higher (or even exclusive) child benefits for third and higher-order children. 
The design that has prevailed to the present day reflects the compromise reached at the time: child benefits are 
granted for all children, but there are substantial supplements for higher-order children in large families. 
 
The child benefit system is organised along socio-professional lines and consists of three regimes: one for 
employees, one for the self-employed and one for civil servants. In recent times, the principal differences 
between these regimes have been reduced substantially (including in terms of benefit amounts). Since the 
introduction in the 1980s of a general funding system (‘Globaal Beheer/Gestion Globale’), social security 
contributions and other revenues of the social security system are no longer assigned a priori to any particular 
branch of that system. 
  
In the allocation of child benefits, three legal concepts are used. In principle, child benefits are paid to the mother 
(the benefit recipient ) of the entitling child on the basis of rights that have been accumulated by the entitled 
person. Starting from these three notions and the abovementioned regimes, the system has been gradually 
adapted to strongly changing family structures. Every effort was made to universalise child benefits: despite the 
fragmented design of the system, families with children now almost invariably receive child support. At the 
same time, however, recent developments in child benefits exhibit a strong tendency towards selectivity: in part 
to resolve the fact that child benefits have not followed the rise in the general standard of living, the amounts for 
the most vulnerable families (including those with long-term unemployed heads and lone-parent households) 
have been increased. Increasingly the system departs from the initial demogrant design. 
 
Most child benefit payments are made through so-called employers’ payment funds. As a result of successive 
mergers, most of these funds have grown quite substantially. They now usually operate in at least two of the 
country’s three regions. They are funded by the public authorities on the basis of, among other things, criteria 
relating to the quality of service offered. In other words, these institutions have, to a considerable degree, been 
encouraged to undergo a process of ‘responsibilisation’.    
    
The child benefit system initially entailed a considerable interregional transfer from Wallonia to Flanders.
19  
However, the redistributive flow has since been reversed: average expenditures on child benefits are now 
approximately 15% higher in Wallonia than they are in Flanders (Cantillon et al., 2008, p. 136). This is 
explained by the higher birth rate in Wallonia, the higher proportion of families entitled to increased child 
benefit through unemployment, and the higher proportion of orphans and disabled parents and children. 
  
Generally speaking, the system would appear to work satisfactorily: almost all families receive their child benefit 
payments on time, without too many problems. Yet, there are problems, about which there seems to be a great 
deal of interregional agreement. These are of a twofold nature. 
  
First, there is the enormous complexity of the system due to much greater selectivity in the allocation of amounts 
and the numerous adjustments to the entitlement rules necessitated by societal evolutions towards new and often 
less stable family types. These rules, constituting an almost unfathomable amalgam of administrative modalities 
of allocation and control, affect the regimes for employees, the self-employed and civil servants alike. A merger 
of the three regimes might therefore result in a very substantial administrative simplification.
20 More in 
particular, the concept of the entitled person would become superfluous. It would no longer be necessary in the 
allocation of child benefits to identify a person who is able to assert the right to child support under one of three 
distinct regimes. Only the receiving child and its family context would then serve as a basis for child benefit 
allocation. Hence, for reasons of administrative simplification as well as social efficacy, the merger of the three 
regimes would appear to be a first priority for future child benefit policy. 
 
Second, there is the efficacy of child benefits in the light of population ageing. Over the past thirty years, growth 
in the average spending per child has decelerated, so that, since the 1990s, it has barely kept apace with 
purchasing power developments. The basic amounts, the age supplements and the social supplements have all 
been subject to a welfare decline of approximately 30%. Should this trend – which is implicitly incorporated into 
                                                        
19 It emerges from the political debates that this was not always considered self-evident : "Il y a là quelque chose de 
souvereinement injuste...Une partie des cotisations patronales de Verviers va servir à encourager la natalité en Flandre, ou 
elle est dejà considerable, et à y rendre la main-d'oeuvre encore meilleur marché, alors qu'elle devrait servir à enrayer la 
dénatalité dans nos contrées ", Senator Simonis, cited by De Koster, 2001, p. 130. 
20 Although there seems to be a large consensus around this idea, in Wallonia it is sometimes perceived as a threat, as it might 
create opportunities for alternative types of funding that would bring the system closer to devolutionary reform.   10 
the calculations of the cost of population ageing by the Federal Planning Bureau – persist, then child benefits 
will lose a further 16 to 36% in welfare capacity by 2030.  This threatens to seriously undermine their social 
efficacy. In order to cushion the negative effects in terms of child poverty under such a scenario, ever greater 
selectivity towards vulnerable families shall be required. The child benefit system would then increasingly 
diverge from the original demogrant design. The horizontal solidarity of childless families with those with 
children would decline, and consequently so too may the perceived legitimacy of the entire system. It would 
therefore seem essential that the link be re-established between child benefits and the general level of welfare. 
An equally important argument in this respect is the need for an equitable distribution of the cost of population 
ageing: child benefits are a very strong instrument for achieving this while taking due account of the burden that 
families bear in the raising of the next generation.  
    
 
5.2. What about decentralisation? 
 
On the basis of the theoretical arguments discussed in part I, we may assert first and foremost that, in view of the  
basically universalistic design of the system, the complexity of implementation (which, given the great diversity 
and fluidity in family types, will remain even if the three existing regimes are merged) and the current mode of 
organisation (with child benefit funds generally operating in different communities) it seems more rational to 
maintain a unified structure than to devolve. The gradual transfer of child benefit files from the Flemish 
authorities to the Federal Service for Child Benefits for Employees is illustrative in this respect. Likewise, a 
centralised approach would appear to be more efficient for the necessary but complex integration of the regimes 
for employees, self-employed and civil servants. The potential benefits of scale should certainly not be 
underestimated. 
 
In view of the substantial commuting flows from Flanders and Wallonia to Brussels, the argument of 
interregional externalities would also appear to be relevant here. The coordination rules imposed by the EU 
stipulate that social benefits (irrespective of how they are funded) should be allocated to all those employed in a 
given country. It can be expected that in the future the applicability of this stipulation shall be extended to 
regional entities (at present, it applies only to interstate flows, as the case of the Flemish care insurance scheme 
demonstrates). This would imply that a child benefit system in Brussels would have to unilaterally bear the cost 
associated with not only European parents working in the Belgian capital but – by extension – also Flemish and 
Walloon parents employed there. Any negative consequences for the financial viability of the child benefit 
system and/or for child benefit amounts in the Brussels Region could then only be remedied by means of a 
complex system of compensation. It speaks for itself that the complexity of such a compensatory system would 
be proportional to the regional differences in regulation. 
 
National solidarity would also seem to be preferable from the perspective of intergenerational redistribution: the 
intended horizontal redistribution envisaged through child benefits contains an important element of 
intergenerational solidarity. Child benefits are, after all, an effective way of distributing the cost of population 
ageing in an equitable way while taking due account of the investment by young families in future generations. 
 
The casuistry of child benefits suggests that the argument of cost effectiveness which is used usually as an 
argument in favour of decentralization also works the other way round: competition between regions does not 
necessarily lead to better cost effectiveness. As in the case of the Flemish care insurance, competition over 
competences between regions and the federal level may actually cause a rise rather than a decline in cost. A 
similar cost-increasing dynamics unfolded recently in relation to the so-called school bonus, which was first 
introduced in Flanders only for the federal level to follow suit.  
  
There are however also strong arguments for more decentralisation.  
 
First, in relation to the aspect of cost effectiveness, there are examples to support the theoretical assumption. We 
refer to higher education, where Wallonia decided to establish a two-year rather than a one-year Master’s. This, 
of course, implies an additional year of child benefit. However, the associated cost will be borne by the federal 
budget, not by the Walloon government, even though it was responsible for the decision. In this respect, 
devolution would result in greater accountability on the part of the regions. 
 
Secondly, the innovation argument is to some extent also relevant to the context of child benefits. Devolved 
social policymaking offers a potential for innovation. The Flemish school bonus, for example, is dependent on 
whether or not the child attends school. In this manner, the Flemish government hopes to reduce the incidence of 
truancy, in what is a good example of the ‘laboratory of democracy’ (Jung, 2005).   11 
 
Closely linked with the innovation and the cost effectiveness arguments are the differential preferences and 
needs between the regions. The argument of the so-called ‘homogeneous  competency packages’ also ties in with 
this rationale. Specifically in Flanders, it is argued that child benefits should be devolved so that a link would be 
established with the regional competencies in the field of family policy. While it is unclear where precisely the 
special links between regional family policy and child benefits lie, there is an unmistakable connection with 
education policy, as the aforementioned example relating to the consequences of the different implementation of 
the Bachelor and Masters’ reforms shows. This argument is also relevant to the application of the child benefit 
regulation to students in higher education. As the definition of a student is crucial in the allocation of child 
benefits for children over the age of 18, and as this definition is increasingly diverging along regional lines, there 
is a strong argument to be made for competency in matters concerning child benefits for above-school-age 
children to be devolved to the regions. 
 
We conclude that there are valid arguments for child benefits to remain a federal area of competence in the 
Belgian setting, particularly in a period when the system is undergoing necessary structural change. It is, after 
all, more rational to organise the necessary (but inevitably complex) integration of the regimes for employees, 
the self-employed and civil servants at a single level of decision-making. Moreover, any decentralisation of the 
system would give rise to severe negative externalities, especially in Brussels: given the European regulations on 
the opening of rights, the substantial commuting flows to Brussels, not only from other EU Member States but 
also from Flanders and Wallonia, would most likely generate a substantial burden for a separate child benefits 
system in the Brussels Capital region. There have moreover been indications that a transition to such a devolved 
system would not necessarily save costs. Still, that is not to say that a well-considered decentralisation might not 
be useful in some specific instances. First, one could introduce a system whereby the regional entities are held 
financially accountable for the consequences of any policy decisions impacting on child benefit payments. 
Second, one might wish to reflect on the appropriateness of transferring competence in matters concerning child 
benefits for above-school-age children to the communities so that a logical link would be established with 
already devolved education policy. Third, it may make sense to introduce regional benefits provided they are 






The three systems we have considered in this article (retirement pensions, health insurance and child benefits) 
are in need of reform. Regional decentralization is not an essential part of these reforms, and it may even be 
counterproductive. On the other hand, there are inefficiences in the present allocation of competencies between 
the regions and the federal state and in each of the systems some changes in the overall design would be helpful. 
These changes can be realized without undermining the interpersonal solidarity, which is the core of our value 
system. In each of the three systems collaboration between the regional governments and of the regional 
governments with the federal state is necessary. An open discussion about these issues is badly needed in 
Belgium. The theoretical arguments that have been put forward in a cool and detached way by the economic 
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